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RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY. St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers.
1933. Vol. I, pp. xxxiv, 1-636; Vol. II, pp. xxviii, 637-1390.
WITH the publication of the Restatement of Agency, the American Law Institute
passes its second milestone. In the evaluation of such a work the reviewer essays a
perplexing task. Indubitably, the product of a Mechem and a Seavey, assisted by the
galaxy of helpers employed in this endeavor, will be thorough, precise, authentic. To
say so with multiplied words is to paint the lily. As for the importance of the Re-
statement project and its significance for the legal profession, these have been pro-
claimed from every housetop for the last ten years. Hence unless one wishes to sit
in the seat of the scornful, or at least to question the desirability of the objectives set
and the means adopted, there is little that may be said with profit. I shall content
myself with comment upon a few heads which seem to me of special interest.
In the first place, as compared with the Contracts Restatement, conservatism and
a desire not to state the law too far in advance of the present cases are strikingly
apparent. In Contracts, promissory estoppel1 and advanced ideas about protecting
the offeree who has begun performance under an offer to a unilateral contract 2 found
acceptance. In Agency, on the other hand, there is a marked tendency to state the
,law in accordance with conventional formulae, even in situations where there exist
authorities supporting a different view. Thus the traditional common-law rule that
the agent's authority terminates upon the principal's death, regardless of notice, is set
forth with no mention of competing lines of authority.3 In undisclosed principal trans-
actions, the election by judgment rule is adopted in respect to the third person's right
to pursue both principal and agent, despite the existence of practically as many cases
of equal dignity in support of the satisfaction rule.4 The opportunity to restate the
duty of an agent to return things received by him on behalf of an undisclosed principal
on rescission of the transaction in accordance with general quasi-contract principles,
yields to the weight of decided cases in the particular field.5
This necessity of election between adherence to the weight of decided cases and
proclamation of what is regarded as the more preferable rule is the result of putting
the Restatement in the form of a series of dogmatic assertions in black-letter type.
The choice is not an easy one. In theory the Restatement is an outline of the existing
law. It is restatement, not legislation. Too wide a departure from the numerical
weight of authority may raise a proper doubt as to its authenticity. On the other
hand, the natural tendency of judges and lawyers to rely upon a compendium of legal
principles emanating from so respectable a source creates the danger that too con-
1. CONTmAeTS RESTATEET (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 90.
2. Id. § 45.
3. AGENCY RESTATEMzENT (Ain. L. Inst. 1933) § 120.
4. Id. §§ 210, 337. For a discussion of the desirability of this position see Merrill, Election
Between Agent and Undisclosed Principal: Shall We Follow the Restatement? (1933) 12
NEB. L. BuLL. 100.
5. AGENCY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1933) § 341. For a statement of the reasons
leading to the casting of the section in this form see Comment to § 564, AGENcY RESTATE-
mENT, Draft T. No. 6 (Am. L. Inst. 1931) 193.
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servative an exposition may check wholesome development. Mr. Mechem's original
plan of stating the existence of competing rules might have avoided this danger. 6
As it is, the safeguard against undue reaction and ultra-progressivism seems to lie in
the state annotations and in critical comment upon and evaluation of the Restatement's
canons dealing with the more controversial points. If the state annotator's work is
properly done, it will be possible to determine with a minimum of effort not only the
extent to which the local law departs from the Restatement but also the reasons
underlying the variation. Critical comment upon the Restatement rulings on disputed
matters, particularly with reference to their expedience from the standpoint of social
engineering, will be of immeasurable value to courts in determining whether they
shall follow the American Law Institute's position. We need many of them, and
quickly, both in Contracts and in Agency.
7
Many, captivated by the notion of uniformity in the law, to whom the ordering
and unifying function seems the chief end of the Restatements, may not agree with
the notion that there should be such an examination of bases, with the concurrent
tendency to perpetuate or to evolve variant rules in different jurisdictions.8 But
to me it seems that uniformity comes at too high a price when it is obtained at the
sacrifice of what is deemed to be the better rule and I should regard it as little
short of catastrophic should there develop a tendency to crush the search for the
preferable formula in the dead clasp of the Restatements. Fortunately, the Ameri-
can Law Institute itself does not conceive of its task as involving the attempt to
root out competing doctrines in this manner, and there is every reason to believe
that judges will not invest it with any such infallibility.
But while the Restatement of Agency is marked by a tendency to stand by the
ancient landmarks of the law, in matters of terniinology and of analysis it is
characterized by a highly progressive trend. In the definition of authority and
of apparent authority in terms of power,9 a step is taken that should clear away
much of the doubt and confusion which has clung to the judicial use of these two
nomes. If judges and teachers pave the way by themselves accurately employing
this terminology, we may expect its use to become common within a comparatively
short time with a resultant gain in clarity and accuracy in the presentation of
matters to the courts and in the analysis of cases by the practitioner.
Possibly one of the greatest shocks to the bulk of the profession will come from
reading the definition of master, servant and independent contractor.' o Under it
all agents are either servants or independent contractors, though of course not all
independent contractors are agents. The instinctive reaction of most lawyers will
be to cry out in protest against this statement. Upon reflection, however, it be-
comes more and more apparent that here again the Restatement brings us a definition
which really defines in place of the somewhat slipshod ones in previous use. Bar-
ring the situations in which the term is used by a statute in some special sense,
it seems impossible to think of a case in which this test does not give us the proper
result.
Perhaps one of the most valuable features of the Restatement is the analysis of
6. Sir Frederick Pollock has commented on this in a review of the Contracts Restatement
in Book Review (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rxv. 363.
7. See for further comment upon the need for such writing, Clark, The Restatement of
the Law of Contracts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 643, 664-667.
8. See Franklin, Review of Contracts Restatement (1933) 8 Tu_. L. Rzv. 149, 150.
9. AOsxc" REsTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1933) §§ 6-8.
1O. Id. § 2.
19341
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the concept of notice.11 Professor Seavey first developed this in an article some
years ago. 12 His present analysis varies somewhat in terminology and is based
upon a division of notice into knowledge on the one hand and notification on the
other. Such a division clears up much of the apparent confusion existing in regard
to the subject of notice through an agent, and in fact with respect to notice gener-
ally.' 3 It may be that a further classification into absolute notice, including all
notification and some knowledge, and what for want of a better term may be
dubbed cognitive notice would be of some advantage in explaining the difference
between cases like United States National Bank v. Forstedt14 on the one hand
and Irvine v. Grady15 on the other, and in forestalling such manifestly unjust
results as lurk in the decision in New England Trust Co. v. Bright.16 Of this I
hope to have more to say on another occasion.
To sum up: We have in this Restatement a work which, adequately supple-
mented by state annotations and critical evaluations, will be of great service alike
to judges and lawyers. As with all other tools, its value depends chiefly on how
we use it. We must not make of it an idol, upon whose altar we sacrifice the hope
of improvement and development in the law. In so doing we should dishonor the
eminent scholars who have labored upon it and frustrate their hopes. Let us
employ it as the means by which to better our law and its administration in this
particular field.
University of Nebraska College of Law. MAURICE H. MERRILL.
CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY. By Roscoe T. Steffen. St. Paul: West Publish-
ing Co. 1933. pp. xxix, 836.
IN the preparation of this casebook the author drastically departed from the
accepted treatment accorded to Agency by such outstanding authorities as Goddard,
Keedy, Mechem and Seavey. Steffen's principal thesis is, to quote from his Preface,
that "the center of gravity in the Agency field has long since shifted to the prob-
lems of the business organization; the Agency of the 'horse era' has become too
'dehydrated' to survive in present-day competition." In the Introduction this
thought is amplified: "The striking development in recent years has been the
rise of the vast organizations of 'agents,' in the broad sense, employed in modem
business, ranging from chairman of the board of directors on down to the janitor's
helper or the office boy. As might be expected from this change of setting many
of the agency principles developed for an earlier day do not apply. . . . Not less
important to note at the outset is the profound change in the type of 'principal'
to be dealt with today. . . . But most transactions today are conducted on behalf
of the corporation, the business trust or the partnership. . . . Recognition of this,
however, does not render wholly obsolete the earlier learning, but it does entail
a considerable shift in emphasis."
The book is divided into three parts: (1) "The Employment Relation," in which
one finds sections devoted to such topics, inter alia, as the Tenure of Officers and
Directors, Negative Covenants and Trade Secrets, Management Responsibility for
11. Id. § 9.
12. See Seavey, Notice Through an Agent (1916) 65 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 1.
13. The term is borrowed from Professor Seavey. See Seavey, supra note 12, at 2.
14. 64 Neb. 855, 90 N. W. 919 (1902).
15. 85 Tex. 120, 19 S. W. 1028 (1892).
16. 274 Mass. 407, 174 N. E. 469 (1931).
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Losses, The Personal Injury Risks, and Workmen's Compensation; (2) "Conduct of
Business by Representatives," which is the most conventional subdivision of the
book, although even here there appear sections on such matters as Transactions
Requiring Directors' Action, "Ultra Vires" Corporate Transactions, and Promoters
and Unauthorized Agents as Parties; (3) "The 'Principal'-Forms of Association-
Limited Liability," in which most of the cases deal with various forms of partner-
ship responsibility, with membership associations, with joint stock associations and
business trusts, with de facto corporations, and with parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions.
Steffen's insistence that the modem agent is, in most instances, a representative
of a group, whether it be an incorporated or an unincorporated association, and
that accordingly the comparatively simple individualistic illustrations of a past
generation no longer portray the realities of representative activity, is unquestionably
sound. Moreover, his casebook has been prepared with extreme care and skill;
the introductory note to each section and the footnotes to each principal case are
excellent aids to an understanding of the problems posited. Consequently, to those
believing that law schools should continue to present a separate course in Agency,'
this volume will have a tremendous appeal, for it not only furnishes material for
developing all of the major doctrines of Agency law as conventionally taught, but
also projects this process into a modem, realistic setting.
University of Pennsylvania Law School. ALEXANDER HAMILTON FREY.
CRoSS-EXAmINATION AND SUMMATION. By Jules H. Barr and Simon Balicer. New
York: Modem Law Publishers. 1933. pp. 622, xii.
THIS is not a mere work on advocacy. If it were, it would, of course, contain the
highly entertaining material to be found in Wellman, Donovan, and others who
have made like efforts. There is nothing more delightful than a reading of the
artistic accomplishments of a skilled trial lawyer. The book deals, however, with
something different. It is intended, apparently, as an introduction, primarily, to
the orderly conduct of a trial, for the use of the apprentice. It is what might be
called a practical book, which points out to the beginner the various stages in the
trial of cases and summarizes some of the rules of evidence and practice for his
guidance. It deals, in the main, with cross-examination and summation from this
viewpoint and contains a number of model summations. These are designed to
illustrate a sound method of handling specific situations, such as comment on the
failure to call an important witness, observations on a witness who is a minor or
ex-convict, and similar matters of common experience. The summations cover 24
distinct types of cases, including one which involved liability for a dog bite.
A young lawyer who has assisted at a few trials will probably have acquired
enough knowledge of the routine to be able to take the supposedly cold plunge
without a guide book. The authors recognize that cross-examination can be learned
only by, practice and not by rule. Nevertheless, considerable space is devoted to
teaching cross-examination by an exposition of methods relating to such operations
1. For reasons set forth in an article entitled Some Thoughts on Law Teaching and
the Social Sciences, (1934) 82 U OF PA. L. REv. 463, I am disinclined to agree that a sepa-
rate course in Agency should be offered. Hence I should tend to regard Steffen's scholarly
product somewhat as a work of supererogation, did I not feel that it will admirably serve




as pinning down evasive witnesses, exposing the professional witness, establishing
bias or hostility, and destroying credibility. As no one can boast that he has
learned the art of cross-examination from a book, the work is necessarily submitted
to the younger members of the profession under a considerable handicap.
As an exposition of the law on matters relating to evidence and trial practice,
the book is necessarily inadequate. Nor does it attain academic perfection. Ex-
pounders of the law will quarrel with some of the rule of thumb statements-for
example, on presumptions of fact. The treatment of testimony by a witness as to
taste, color, smell, and so forth, as opinion evidence, is, of course, unsound, for
any student in a good law school today knows that such evidence is not received as
expert testimony, but as evidence of the observation of a fact. To the extent that
the authors have perpetuated such inaccuracies, the book cannot, of course, be ap-
proved as a model of erudition. But in the rough and tumble of ordinary trial
experience perhaps an over-encouragement of scholarly refinements should not be
indulged.
This short cut to the study of evidence can evoke little enthusiasm. All that
the work actually gives on trial practice may be summed up in a few pages. No
useful book has ever been written on the art of trying a case. Entertaining works,
with literary excellence, have been produced on the subject, but this does not
claim to be one of them.
New York City. GEORGE Z. MEDALIE.
PLEBISCITES SINCE TlE WORLD WAR: with a Collection of Official Documents. By
Sarah Wambaugh. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
1933. Vol. I, pp. xxix, 603; Vol. II, pp. xiv, 614.
IT has become fashionable to dismiss Wilsonian idealism as war propaganda and
to condemn even innovations in the Peace Settlement, such as the Mandates System
and the League of Nations, as hypocritical disguises to mask the sinister designs
of the victors for dominion and profit. One may readily grant that the peace-
makers were responsible for much injustice and folly. Nevertheless it remains true
that, had it not been for Wilson and for the ideals to which he gave expression, the
embittered and vengeful victors-would have imposed a far more vindictive peace,
a peace like that of Brest-Litovsk which the law of the jungle would not have
considered unjust to a beaten foe. As it was, the insistence of Wilson and, less
consistently or disinterestedly, of Lloyd George prevented the transference of certain
disputed regions without the prior consent of the people concerned. Furthermore,
it is to be remembered that in at least five cases the appeal to the self-determination
of the people resulted in the restoration of all or part of the disputed areas to the
defeated power.
The two substantial volumes under review contain a careful, exhaustive and well-
documented account of the plebiscites held in the former Danish province of
Schleswig; in Allenstein and Marienwerder and in Upper Silesia to determine the
Polish-German border; in the Austrian Klagenfurt Basin which the Jugoslavs cov-
eted; and in the small district of Sopron claimed by Austria and Hungary. With
equal industry and objectivity Professor Wambaugh analyzes the preparations for
the forthcoming plebiscite in the Saar Territory; the rival claims of the Poles and
Czechs to Teschen and the neighboring counties of Orava and Spisz; the claims of
the Poles and Lithuanians to Vilna; and the claims of Chile and Peru to Tacna-
Arica where plebiscites were attempted but abandoned. More briefly, and properly
so, are treated such partisan "consultations" as took place in Eupen and Malm~dy,
Mosul and several other regions. An introductory chapter gives an historical sum-
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mary of the appeals to self-determination during the war and of the peace negotia-
tions. Two final chapters summarizing and comparing the post-war plebiscites, and
analyzing the criticisms levelled against the ideal of self-determination and indicating
the essential requirements for an impartial plebiscite, followed by an excellent
bibliography, conclude the first volume. Volume II contains the texts of the official
documents.
Students of the problem of nationalism, particularly of such constructive phases
as self-determination, autonomy and the like, will be grateful to Professor Wam-
baugh for so mature and definitive a study and for making available the pertinent
documents. It must not be supposed, however, that this is merely a dry com-
pilation of resolutions, regulations for voting, and statistical material. The general
reader with serious interests and imagination will find much profit in the description
of the character and history of the various regions, their value and resources, the
racial and cultural affiliation of the people and the attempts at compulsory assimila-
tion by the ruling nationalities. The election campaigns, too, involving as they did
attempted corruption, fraud and intimidation, as well as more subtle forms of propa-
ganda, will divert, though they can hardly startle or instruct the American reader
who is acquainted with the antics of the political machines of our large cities.
The layman, as well as the specialist, will agree with the author that the plebiscite
is preferable to conquest or arbitrary decision by the Great Powers as a guide for
revising national boundaries. Everyone will likewise sympathize with the author's
desire to perfect the plebiscite so as to render it an effective tool for ascertaining
the genuine wishes of the inhabitants of disputed regions. Yet not a few of Pro-
fessor Wambaugh's readers will be impressed with the imperfections of the plebiscite.
Under the best of circumstances agitation is encouraged, national feeling inflamed,
and old and suppressed hatreds revived and brought to the surface, so that intimida-
tion and violence during the campaign and revenge after the decision become almost
unavoidable. Besides, economic and strategic considerations and the intermixture
of populations render it well-nigh impossible to draw a boundary strictly in accord
with national feeling. Minorities will, therefore, remain on both sides of the border
and will require protection by international guarantee, if oppression and animosity
are to be reduced to a m~inimum. One is, therefore, tempted to draw the conclusion
that the plebiscite should be employed only where a rectification of the frontier
becomes absolutely unavoidable. Otherwise a solution of the national problem in
heterogeneous regions would appear to require the creation of multi-national states
in which a broad national autonomy would be vouchsafed each nationality.
Professor Wambaugh's scholarly volumes should greatly help to dispel the wide-
spread superstition that current historical developments cannot be treated adequately
by contemporaries. It is true that much of the vast literature relating to post-war
history-the impressions, reflections, evaluations, surveys and compilations for class-
room use-has an air of impermanence about it. But that is due not so much to
the contemporaneous character of the subject-matter as to the fact that so many
writers are poorly equipped for their work. The present author has studied the
question of plebiscites for nearly two decades; she served with the Secretariat of
the League of Nations; she was technical adviser to the Peruvian Government for
the plebiscite in Tacna-Arica; she visited the disputed regions, read the documents,
discussed the question with members of the plebiscite commissions, with the partisan
national leaders and with men and women "who had merely taken part in the voting."
Professor Wambaugh possesses an enviable linguistic equipment and a calm impar-
tiality which remains unruffled even in the face of the trying disingenuousness of
the Chilean partisans in Tacna-Arica. An author with the ability, objectivity and
preparation of Professor Wambaugh would produce a definitive work whether the
material dealt with the twelfth century or the twentieth.
The College of the City of New York. OSCAR I. JANowsKy.
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ORGANIZATION AND ETHICS OF BENCH AND BAR. By Frederick C. Hicks. Rochester:
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1932. pp. x, 606.
THis book, ranging over a wide diversity of subject-matter, was a welcome addition
to a field which had never been properly covered in a single volume. It contains
materials on almost every subject with which the bar is chiefly concerned to-day.
Starting with a description of the English and American system of courts, it goes
into the instrumentalities of law reform, suggested methods of selecting judges,
the incorporated bar, systems of admission and their legality, supervision and disci-
pline of the bar, unauthorized practice, and finally, including more than half the
book, problems of legal ethics. Following most of the chapters is an exhaustive
list of from a dozen to twenty appropriate supplementary readings which are of
great worth for reference purposes. This material alone makes the book an impor-
tant addition to the library of every judge and bar association official who wants to
keep informed of current movements in the field of law reform. The American
Bar Association canons of professional and judicial ethics are given in the appendix.
Professor Hicks has, out of his own classroom experience, provided an admirable
source book for a course dealing with the ideals and practices of the legal pro-
fession that answers in a very satisfactory manner the demand made by the legal
profession that the law schools undertake the training of their students in the tra-
ditions and ethics of the bar. The crowded curriculum of the modem law school
has led to a neglect of this fundamental side of legal education, which the displaced
apprenticeship system taught by personal contact. It is sought to excuse this
neglect by pointing out that it is not feasible to train the mature law student in
moral precepts. Be it said, however, to the credit of our leading law schools, that
they have realized that this was a problem to be met, and that they are working
out what seems to be a satisfactory solution. Eighty-four per cent of the law
schools of the country now offer some variety of a course dealing with professional
ethics.
By linking such a study with surveys of legal reform, biographies of famous jurists,
the history and traditions of the bar, more interesting subject-matter and increased
intellectual content are gained. While the resolution passel by the American Bar
Association in 1929 recommended only the teaching of professional ethics, the
National Conference of Bar Examiners at its 1932 meeting in Washington went
farther and urged historical studies as "conducive to a sound understanding and
appreciation of the profession" and as tending toward "high standards of professional
conduct." It recommended that an inquiry be made to determine if applicants pos-
sess "a fair knowledge of the history, background, traditions and functions of the
legal profession and its standards of professional conduct." While Professor Hicks'
book does not deal directly with the history of the profession, his lists of supple-
mentary readings give valuable sources for this study, and the book as a whole is
almost a direct answer to this prayer for a wider knowledge on the part of the
student of the profession he is about to enter.
Although the book is designed as the basis of a law school course, its chapters
on the advantages of English procedure, on judicial councils and unified courts,
and on the selection of judges, contain a great deal of information which many of
our practitioners do not possess, and which all of them will find interesting. Further-
more the cases on ethics, besides making absorbing reading, bring out in clear relief
questions of legal etiquette and the more doubtful of those instances where public
policy and moral issues are involved. The reader is not bored with discussions of
the obvious. Both lawyers and laymen will find the treatment of lay encroachments
well worth attention. And the chapters on professional charges and contingent fees
are good reading for anyone having to do with lawyers.
[Vol. 43
BOOK REVIEWS
The only adverse criticism the writer has to offer of this book is that too much
reliance is placed upon the case material. Not enough facts are given concerning
the actual progress of the movements discussed in the section dealing with law reform
and the organization of the bar. There is, for example, no adequate treatment of
the unauthorized practice of law which is creating such a ferment in our bar every-
where at the present time. Nine cases are given dealing with particular instances
of lay encroachments, but there is nowhere any indication as to how seriously this
problem is being taken or what efforts, other than prosecution, are being made to
solve it. Some of the material referred to under the heading of "Supplementary
Reading" might have been included with profit. Of course, the Stock Yards Bank
case,' quoted at length, is an excellent choice. Similarly inadequate seems the
treatment of the development of judicial councils and the integrated bar movement,
which are both extremely important in the field of law reform. Grievance com-
mittee procedure and disbarment machinery might have been better brought out
by the use of text material.
It is realized that Professor Hicks intended this book for use in connection with
his class on the subject; probably the materials above referred to are fully developed
in the classroom. It is an exceedingly useful and interesting document as it stands,
and deserves to be classed as a worthy pioneer in an important field of law school
work.
Denver, Colorado. WILL SHAFROTH.
CASES AND OTHER AUTHORrIES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND ITS ETHICS. By
George P. Costigan, Jr. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1933. pp. xxiv, 768.
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE AmERicAN BAR AND ITS ETHIcs. By Herschel
Whitfield Arant. Chicago: Callaghan & Company. 1933. pp. xiii, 687.
THE editors of these volumes assume that it is possible, by instructing the mind, to
mould the character of an adult student so as to influence his behavior during his
forthcoming professional life. Judged upon the basis of this assumption, as, in the
first instance they ought to be judged, each book represents an excellent selection
of the material available in the field of legal ethics.
Compilations of adequate case material in that field are not numerous. It is
important, on any theory, to have such material available in the orderly and com-
prehensive manner in which these books present it, since to make any system of
ethics effective it has always been necessary to provide means for stressing and
promulgating its dogma in order that an accepted orthodoxy may gain recognition.
For a similar reason source books for secular as well as for religious ideals lose
nothing by being explicit; knowledge, while no guarantor of wisdom or righteousness,
prompts them better than does ignorance.
The editors have rightly assumed that the sincere beginner will want to know the
rules to which he will be expected to conform and also the scale of punishments
against which their infraction is measured. If he studies either of these volumes
he will learn what they are. He will find the canons annotated and examples of the
ways in which the courts have enforced them. He will find illustrated the great con-
cepts with which he should be familiar: the theory of the courts' power over the
bar; the distinction between the practice of law and business; an attorney's relation
to the court, as its officer; to his client, as his fiduciary; to his opponent, as an
honorable antagonist; and to the public, as its servant. The bulk of each book
1. People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 lI. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931).
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is devoted to a thorough canvassing of these major divisions. It is hard to conceive
of a practical problem in every-day conduct which has been left unconsidered.
In his preface Professor Costigan asserts that unethical conduct is largely grounded
in sheer ignorance, and infers that the remedy is to enforce enlightenment. Dean
Arant concurs, at least to the extent that instruction should remove any equity
in such a defense. The truth of the point is still speculative, because, for want of
genuinely objective analyses, we know so little about the psychological reactions
and the impressionability, in this field, of the material being worked upon-the stu-
dent himself. On this issue the educators and the leaders of the profession alike
have stood at one extreme. Practically all their efforts in behalf of ethics in its
utilitarian aspects, have been greatly over-intellectualized, and have ignored the
true quasi-emotional nature of the problem. At the other extreme the cynics dis-
miss all ethical instruction with the gibe that though one may thus improve the
manners of honest men, he risks, at the same time, making otherwise dull rascals
shrewd. Conceding something to the cynics, the dilemma they pose has, nevertheless,
been rendered academic by the compelling necessity for action of some kind in the
face of sharply declining professional standards, a necessity which justifies any well-
considered effort, regardless of its final evaluation. Unfortunately, we have no way
of computing the number of plastic souls neither unalterably honest nor rascally.
It is to their particular needs that we must design our prophylactic methods. Unless
we wish their ethics to be conditioned on implanted fears (penology's own device,
and one much employed for masses generally), we must strive to develop in them
courage and a quick sense of fair play. Such qualities are difficult to engraft when
natively absent. For this reason one might view with hesitant approval the exhaust-
ive detail of these casebooks, unless that feature be intended to afford a discipline
for the mind similar to the mental discipline inherent in the study of common law
pleading. Close study of five hundred pages of judicial exposition of ethical princi-
ples is hard to justify except on the ground that the rationale of the case is often
difficult of statement, or that the factual minutiae of legal ethics itself is amazingly
complex. More probable than esoteric difficulties is a humanitarian dislike on the
part of the courts to chastise their professional brethren; examples of intricate
exposition, when they do so publicly,,are apt to be simply defense mechanisms which
the learner mistakes for exercises in logic. There are, of course, many close ques-
tions in legal ethics, particularly those concerning adverse interests and loyalties,
an understanding of which improves discrimination; but they do not predominate.
There are, too, certain problems which are hard because they are new, such as
those presented by the Cannon case' and the Stock Yards Bank case,2 but such
really lie in the field of political philosophy rather than in that of legal ethics. The
danger of implying that legal ethics is factually complex, or that its application is
frighteningly difficult is, of course, a real one. Exhaustive catechisms may help a
little those who will never have a sense of proportion, but the morally strong see
issues simply. Dogma is necessarily factual in outline, but if that aspect is allowed
an over-emphasis, the well-disposed and suggestible neophyte in whom we are con-
cerned may be found to emerge with a collection of misunderstood and rather impo-
tent inhibitions, instead of a maturing- moral sense.
No tradition exists as to how legal ethics should be taught (save borrowed tech-
niques). We have no "control" of our pedagogical data, and comparative data we
lack. Our system of legal instruction, however, is based on casebooks and our inno-
vations are safer when calibrated to it. A casebook necessarily states problems in
the forms in which they arose and were solved, even though those forms were deter-
mined by a social philosophy no longer sound in every limb. The fact, however, that
it seems to be the only philosophy which the profession understands how to apply,
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or of which it comprehends the mechanics, is of practical importance to both the
student and his teacher. The same practical consideration is a sufficient reason why
a casebook, as such, is not, and should not be expected to be, a philosophic emenda-
tion or an evangelistic tract.
A discussion of the question of whether, if we ever expect to accomplish anything
by teaching ethics at a law school, we shall have to widen the scope of the course,
greatly enlarge its material and change the basic approach, is not of much assistance
in considering the books here reviewed. They should remain of prime value in
any such enlarged endeavor. By negative implication they may be charged with the
suggestion that the material they embrace is all that any student need be made
acquainted with, and until different compilations make their appearance such sug-
gestion may, as a practical matter, influence the development of the subject. If,
however, the more utilitarian programs gain adherents they probably will not lack
printed exposition. In fact, neither of these volumes adheres exclusively to doc-
trinal matter. Professor Costigan would have the student acquaint himself with the
history of the English bar and appreciate the antiquity of many an ethical precept.
Dean Arant minimizes this feature but includes considerable material on the present
conformation and problems of the bar in this country. This general inquiry, passed
over by Professor Costigan, is finely handled in Dean Arant's book under the heading
"Significant Events in the Movement for Better Standards in the Practice of the
Law." Dean Arant also believes that "the range of the subject should be much wider
than has heretofore been recognized."
Can the beginner, presumptively inert, be so energized that he will take part in
the "Movement for Better Standards"? If so, will they improve, and will he him-
self become a better man because he took part in them? An affirmative answer calls
for the illumination of group concepts in the minds of the young, to whom no word
is now whispered that the categorical'imperative may be phrased otherwise than in
the singular (still a quaint preoccupation of the canons themselves). The pro-
fession is struggling with more than the immediate effects of widely spread unethical
behavior. It is trying to analyze causes, many of which are remote and subtle, some
purely economic, and some entwined with deep new social trends and functional
realignments. If we wish to equip the coming generation to grapple with problems
which baffle us it seems reasonable to think we ought to implement them early with
a knowledge of the facts, the backgrounds, and the issues as we understand them.
Such an effort will call for much research, and some self-dissatisfaction, and will
doubtless produce familiar material very differently emphasized and much aug-
mented. Perhaps a course so designed could not be called one in legal ethics. But
it could not fail to widen horizons and heighten an understanding of ethics itself.
And he whom we succeed in teaching that through the proffer of his time and ener-
gies for the realization of the collective ideals of his profession come most certainly
honor and success, will probably never seriously alarm us by his own unethical
conduct.
Such a plea may seem to involve a denial of the whole Kantian philosophy upon
which depends our confidence in the utility of instruction in legal ethics. Quite the
contrary. It may be admitted that there is no substitute for the study of ethics.
But the trouble is that legal ethics, as taught, includes no analysis of motivation,
values, or teleology. It is not designed to insure fundamental orientation. For the
most part, it expounds a ritual of conduct, relying on the supposition that the law
student comes equipped with an understanding of ethics before he commences the
study of legal ethics. Our recent experience with volume indicates that we annually
accept for instruction thousands of whom this is in no sense true. Until we look
at them objectively, we shall not greatly aid the profession in its present distress.
19341
Buffalo, New York. P=IP J. WICKSER.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE. By Edwin W. Patter-
son. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1932. pp. xviii, 840.
PROFESSOR PATTERSON'S book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter on
the insurance carrier sets forth the principal attributes of the different types of
insurance organization such as fraternal, reciprocal, mutual, and stock, and the
extent of legislative control thereof. The second chapter on the interests protected
by insurance is divided into three parts, the first distinguishing insurance from other
types of risk-shifting devices, the second setting forth the interests protected by
property insurance, and the third the interests protected by life and accident insur-
ance. The third chapter on the selection and control of risks is devoted to a
description of the event against which insurance is effected, warranties, representa-
tions and concealment. The fourth chapter Professor Patterson calls "The Distribu-
tion of Insurance Coverage and Service" and puts in it cases describing the process
by which insurance contracts are made, waiver, estoppel and election. Chapter five
is on the adjustment of claims and is subdivided into parts dealing separately with
the adjustment of claims in fire, life and liability insurance. Then there is an
exceedingly elaborate set of appendices including mortality tables, and various policy
forms and riders for all types of insurance.
This is a new plan of organization. Whether it is an advance over other schemes
can be demonstrated only by use. But whether better or worse for pedagogical
purposes, the new cluster-points and shifts in emphasis make possible new contrasts
and comparisons which are sure to be valuable. Professor Patterson's genius for
organization and for scholarly research has borne its best fruit in Chapter I on
the different types of insurance carrier and state supervision of insurance. This
chapter contains much material not heretofore found in casebooks. The very vital
influence of statutory enactment on the development of insurance law cannot be
overlooked. This chapter fills that need in impressive fashion.
In the reviewer's judgment the most serious objection to the plan of th; book
is the exclusion from Chapter II of the material on the character and extent of
the interest of the regularly constituted beneficiary or assignee under different types
of life policies. The section of this chapter which covers the interests protected
by property insurance very properly deals with the interests of mortgagees, vendees,
bailors, assignees, and other third parties. Why should not the section covering
interests protected by life insurance deal with third party interests in life policies?
True, the chapter in question concerns itself with beneficiaries and assignees in so
far as the problem of insurable interest is involved (the Warnock v. Davis problem)
but the larger problems of the character of the interest of the beneficiary or assignee
and of the conflict between their interests and those of the representatives of the
insured under different types of policies are almost untouched; yet do not these
problems fall exactly within the scope of the section, viz., interests protected by life
insurance? Professor Patterson has chosen to put this very important material in
his last chapter on "Adjustment of Claims." Why it should go there is a puzzle.
Any other material in the book might as appropriately have gone there. "Adjust-
ment of Claims" hardly suggests such matters as the insured's powers of assign-
ment and of renaming a beneficiary or the respective interests of assignees and
beneficiaries. The same criticism applies, but with less force, to the inclusion in
this chapter of the material on the incontestable clause. This clause involves the
matter of barring defenses based upon facts occurring prior to the insured's death.
Why should this matter be allocated to a chapter primarily concerned with problems
arising after loss? The chapter title seems entirely appropriate to cover certain
problems arising in fire and liability insurance (as, for example, matters of notice,
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proof of loss, appraisals, the insured's cooperation with the insurer, and the insurer's
control of settlement and litigation), but seems a complete misdescription of the life
insurance material included therein. In the reviewer's judgment, this strained
classification but illustrates the type of difficulty arising from over-generalizations
involved in considering property and personal insurance together. Separate chapters
with distinctive titles would have avoided the difficulty.
Professor Patterson gives little or no attention to the matter of the rights of
creditors (other than assignees) against life insurance policies of different types, or
to that of the extent to which insurance proceeds are subject to inheritance or
succession taxes. These matters the reviewer believes are of great importance,
not for their bearing on the law of taxation or of creditors' rights generally, but
because of the light they throw upon the respective interests of the insured, the
beneficiary and the assignee in the insurance contract. Without this material the
picture seems inadequate. The note on page 305 pointing out that by statute in
many states the proceeds of life insurance are under certain circumstances exempt
from the claims of creditors can mean but little to a student who is furnished no
material showing under what circumstances and to what extent insurance proceeds
are subject to the claims of creditors without an exemption statute. The cases pre-
ceding the note in question deal with a creditor who is a beneficiary or an assignee,
to which situation the exemption statutes have no application. There is danger that
the note will mislead the unwary.
It is believed that Professor Patterson's predisposition to novel terminology has
drawn him into an unfortunate choice of words for his title to Chapter IV, "The
Distribution of Insurance Coverage and Service." From a mere reading of the
title not many lawyers or economists could guess the chapter's content-the making
of the contract, waiver, estoppel and election. However useful the term "distribu-
tion" may be for describing the forces which have to do with the division of the
products of industry, the word is inappropriate and misleading when applied to a
particular legal operation involved in that economic process. Since the system of
insurance as a whole is one of the forces which has to do with the distribution of
wealth, the entire subject of insurance law, or any aspect of it, could be treated
under the head of distribution. For example, the contents of Professor Patterson's
first chapter on the different types of organization that "dispense" insurance might
as appropriately be placed under this heading as the contents of the chapter in
question. If the word is here used in a narrower sense of "sale" or the placing
of the "commodity" upon the market, the error would seem to be that the contract
of insurance is not a device for distribution of coverage, but a device for the creation
of coverage. Coverage cannot be distributed until it is produced. The insurance
contract creates insurance coverage where there was none before. A title more apt
for this chapter might therefore be "The 'Production' of Insurance Coverage."
Though there are resemblances, after all an insurance policy is not a bushel of
wheat, and the process involved in effecting it is essentially dissimilar to the opera-
tion involved in marketing grain.
But these criticisms have to do with comparatively unimportant matters. No
schematic formulation can take on "logical" perfection. It is good or bad, depend-
ing upon the use to which it is to be put, upon what is to be emphasized, upon
what developments or trends are to be shown; and upon such matters agreement
is impossible. These few remarks come simply to this: The reviewer, for reasons
incapable of a priori expression, would prefer to have the job done differently in
certain particulars.
Much can be said in commendation of the book. It contains carefully selected
and skillfully edited cases, stimulating problems and queries at the end of almost
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every case, an interpolation at appropriate places of pertinent and valuable economic
information, references to much (but not all) of the valuable legal periodical ma-
terial, and occasional interesting and useful historical notes on particular phases of
insurance, such as the incontestable clause, the disability provision, mutual insurance
companies, and insurance corporations in the United States. Of such stuff are good
casebooks made.
It was expected by all who were acquainted with Professor Patterson's previous
contributions to insurance law that his casebook would be a first class piece of
work. They have not been disappointed.
University of Illinois GEORGE W. GOBLE.
College of Law.
